Nanya Technology: The Complete Guide

Nanya is the most completely disclosed company in this section, and the reason is regulatory: Taiwanese issuers publish monthly revenue. That makes Nanya the clearest public window onto the memory cycle anywhere in this codex. The 2026 figures are extraordinary and run month by month: January NT$15,309,988 thousand (+608.0% year on year), April NT$25,491,201 thousand (+717.3%), July NT$43,867,609 thousand (+719.6%), August NT$44,690,268 thousand (+560.85%) 8 3. Year to date through August: NT$220,194 million, up 638.19% 3.

Nanya's own page notes that "Monthly revenue figures are unaudited" 8.

The executive team, in Nanya's own titles: Pei-Ing Lee as President, Lin-Chin Su as Executive Vice President, Joseph Wu as "Senior Vice President, Strategic Planning and Administration Management", Rex Chuang as "Senior Vice President, Marketing & Customization Business", and Rex Chen as "Vice President, Global Sales" 12. Chuang's title is worth noting — "Customization Business" is a named senior remit, which is consistent with where Nanya says its growth is going (see The HBM position).

Inotera is the part most often got wrong, so it is worth stating precisely. Nanya's timeline records two separate November 2002 entries — a joint development programme "with Infineon Technologies AG" and, separately, a "Join Venture of 12-inch fab, Inotera Memories Ltd" — without stating who Inotera's other parent was 7. What the record does establish is where the stake ended up: Micron came to hold it, and in 2015 moved to buy out the rest. Micron's announcement describes the sellers as "Formosa Group Companies, including Nanya Technology Corporation, currently own approximately 32 percent of Inotera", at "30 New Taiwan Dollars, equivalent to $0.92 USD per share", for "approximately $3.2 billion, net of cash and debt" 16. Completion came on 6 December 2016 at "approximately $4.0 billion (net of cash and debt)" 17. Nanya's own timeline records the whole episode in five words: "Completed Inotera share swap with Micron" 7.

Note that the ~32% figure is a Formosa group holding, not Nanya's own stake. This check found no primary source giving Nanya's individual percentage, so none is stated 16. Similarly, Nanya's timeline says nothing at all about Qimonda's 2009 collapse, and no Nanya statement about its effect was found — so this page describes the 2008 pivot to Micron, which is documented, and does not narrate the consequences of a failure it cannot source 7.

The "specialty DRAM maker" label often applied to Nanya is going stale, and Nanya's own numbers are the evidence. Its second-quarter 2026 materials state that "AI infrastructure and servers contribute >20% of revenue" 20, with the results release putting the same figure on the first half 21. It has validated 128GB DDR5 RDIMM products 22, and reports that "customized AI UWIO memory has begun contributing initial revenue" 19.

Note also what Nanya does not call itself: this check found no instance of "specialty DRAM" or "consumer DRAM" in its own materials 1 2. The niche description is accurate as industry shorthand but is not Nanya's self-description, and the company is actively arguing the other way.

The significant recent change is EUV. Nanya operated for years without extreme-ultraviolet lithography, and in August 2026 its board resolved that Fab 5A will run "10nm-class technology (i.e. 1C, 1D and 1E) and EUV" 23, with the quarterly deck confirming "1C/1D/1E/EUV development on schedule" 20. The intent goes back further than the resolution: the 2022 groundbreaking release said "An independent building with extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography equipment will be also established for future advanced process" 15.

What Nanya has not announced is a tool order. This check found no official statement that it has purchased EUV scanners from ASML 23 20, so the accurate formulation is that Nanya has committed to deploying EUV at Fab 5A, not that it has confirmed buying the machines. Separately, Nanya is researching what comes after conventional scaling: a 2024 milestone records that it "Collaborates with Kioxia to Develop Vertical Channel Transistor DRAM Technology" 7.

Three different total-investment figures circulate for Fab 5A and all three are Nanya's own, with different scopes. NT$300 billion is the 2022 estimate 15; NT$346.6 billion is the board-approved 2026–2029 window only; and approximately US$16 billion is the total to full 45,000 WSPM capacity 23. Quoting any one of them without its scope produces a misleading number.

Construction is on schedule by Nanya's current account: "The new fab is also progressing on schedule, with equipment installation planned for the first quarter of 2027" 19. Read against the original announcement, though, the schedule has moved a long way: the 2022 groundbreaking release said "The construction is scheduled to be completed by 2025" 15, where wafer input is now set for the second half of 2027 23 — roughly a two-year slip, visible by comparing Nanya's own two statements. Beyond Fab 5A, Nanya issued a statement in August 2026 confirming only that it "continue[s] to work with the relevant authorities and assess potential sites for future expansion", and that new fab decisions will be disclosed as required 24 — specific locations reported in the press are not confirmed by that statement.

Nanya's own read of where memory demand is going is unusually quantified for a company of its size. Its second-quarter 2026 materials describe "AI-driven structural change…mitigating memory market cyclicality", expect "Supply tightness…to persist over the next several quarters", and note "Multi-year LTAs aligning supply-demand expectations" 20 — long-term agreements, the same instrument Micron, Kioxia and SanDisk each described in their own terms. A smaller maker signing multi-year contracts in a shortage is trading peak pricing for the visibility it needs to justify a US$16 billion fab 23.

The one figure Nanya conspicuously does not publish is current capacity. Its only wafer-per-month numbers are historical — the 2008 milestone "FAB-3A 1st phase full capacity with 70nm 1Gb & reach 34K WSPM" 7 — and forward-looking, for Fab 5A 23. There is no present-day total, and no market-share percentage in any Nanya source found here 1. Its "number four" claim is a rank, not a share 1.

Those ASP statements are the most legible price series any maker in this section publishes, because they come quarterly, in plain language, from a company small enough that the whole business moves with the market. Read alongside the monthly revenue disclosures 8, they give an outside observer a closer view of DRAM pricing than Samsung's division-level reporting or Micron's fiscal-quarter aggregates allow.

The vehicle is a joint venture. In August 2025 Nanya and Etron Technology announced plans to establish "a new joint venture dedicated to AI memory design services", capitalised at NT$500 million and owned 80% by Nanya and 20% by Etron, headquartered in Hsinchu City 28. Its purpose is to leverage "NTC's advanced process node and fab capacity to deliver optimized designs of customized ultra-high-bandwidth memory solutions", aimed at "the growing demands of edge AI applications" 28. An earlier step in the same direction is recorded in the 2024 milestones: "Invest in PieceMakers to Develop Customized Ultra-high-bandwidth Memory" 7.

It has started earning: "customized AI UWIO memory has begun contributing initial revenue" 19. What Nanya has never said is whether it intends to enter the standard HBM market — this check found no statement either way, and this page asserts neither 20 28.

Reporting describes a larger placement with several participants and an aggregate in the billions of dollars, but this check verified only the Kioxia subscription from a Nanya document 13 — so no total, and no list of other investors, is stated here.

On the demand side, Nanya's own disclosure is that AI infrastructure and servers passed 20% of revenue in the first half of 2026 21 20 — a company whose reputation rests on legacy parts now earning a fifth of its money from the newest segment in the industry.

A gross margin moving from −10.6% to 79.5% in six quarters 27 21 is what a commodity cycle looks like from inside a company with no other business to cushion it. Nanya makes DRAM and nothing else — no NAND, no logic, no foundry — so its results are close to an unhedged read on the DRAM price.

That is also the argument for reading this page alongside the others. Samsung reports memory inside a division that also contains logic and foundry; Micron's fiscal year ends in a different month from everyone else's; Kioxia's quarterlies are hard to reach. Nanya publishes, monthly, a number that moves almost purely with DRAM 8. For anyone trying to see the cycle itself rather than a company's management of it, Nanya is the clearest instrument in this section.

Two narrower gaps. Nanya publishes no current capacity and no market share 1, so its scale relative to competitors can only be estimated from outside. And its public archive is unusually hard to use: index pages on nanya.com are rendered in the browser and return nothing to a fetcher, individual releases are reachable only by direct identifier, and older items redirect to current ones — which is why this page can document the 2008 pivot to Micron from Micron's SEC filing 14 but cannot document what Qimonda's 2009 collapse did to Nanya from any source at all 7.

Nanya also disclosed, in August 2026, that it was responding to the arrest of an engineer over alleged trade-secret theft for employment in China, stating that it "strictly enforces a zero-tolerance policy against any infringement or unauthorized use" of its intellectual property 24.

That makes seven of the eight makers documented in this section so far with no India manufacturing. Micron is the only one with a plant there, and that plant does assembly and test rather than wafer fabrication.

The question Nanya's next few years turn on is whether a fourth-place maker can fund leading-edge capacity from a cyclical cash flow. The 2026 upcycle has answered it for now — NT$76.25 billion of net profit in one half-year against a US$16 billion programme spread to 2029 20 23 — and the private placement brought in outside capital besides 13. What is not knowable from any current document is where DRAM prices sit when Fab 5A's wafers actually arrive in 2028 and 2029 23. Nanya's monthly disclosures will make the answer visible earlier than any other company in this section 8.